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Thesis Summary
In 1996, Gary Webb and the San Jose Mercury News unleashed a media firestorm
over his “Dark Alliance” series of newspaper articles, which detailed CIA involvement in
the Los Angeles crack cocaine epidemic in the 1980s. The series alleged that a drug ring
in L.A. sold tons of crack to a primarily African-American population in the city, with
profits then smuggled back to Nicaragua to a group of CIA-backed Contras. The series
resulted in four separate investigations into CIA wrongdoing, including one by the U.S.
Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, which
concluded that there were “serious questions as to whether or not US officials… failed to
address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war against Nicaragua.”1 I argue that
the Dark Alliance, although flawed due to some exaggerated claims of causality,
represents an important case study in press and CIA accountability and the ways in
which newscraft and statecraft intersect. This thesis examines the validity of Webb’s
claims of CIA wrongdoing, as well as the press coverage of the events of the series.
Additionally, this thesis studies the effects of the crack cocaine epidemic on Los Angeles
communities and how that drove conspiratorial beliefs after the publication of the Dark
Alliance; largely because of Reagan-era drug enforcement policies and structural
vulnerabilities within these communities, African-Americans were severely affected by
the impact of crack cocaine, compounding conspiratorial beliefs. Finally, this thesis
discusses the overarching themes of secrecy and conspiracy, including the ways in which
mass media can play contradictory roles in the production of ‘public opinion’.

1

United States Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Drugs, Law
Enforcement, and Foreign Policy, 1989, 136.
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000014976124&view=1up&seq=148&skin=2021
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Author’s Note
I would like to express my deep gratitude towards Dr. Jennifer Reynolds, who provided
valuable insight and expertise, countless resources, and hours of her time to help me
write this paper. The researching and writing skills I developed during this process will
stay with me as I enter a new chapter in my life. I would also like to thank Dr.
Magdalena Stawkowski, my second reader, for her helpful comments as I began to
revise my thesis, and I want her to know that I will be back for the seminar featuring the
former KGB officer if at all possible.
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On secrecy and the CIA
Secrecy has long been used in the intelligence community to achieve domestic and
foreign policy goals. The collection and processing of secret information has allowed the
United States to succeed in wartime and diplomacy and has aided decision-making on
the security and defense of the mainland US. At times, secrecy has been used to
communicate essential and valuable information to operatives behind enemy lines,
through the usage of ciphers and codes. Secrecy has also been critical to obtaining
economic advantages over other competitors on the world stage and at home. However,
over time, secrecy as it is related to intelligence services has taken on a more nefarious
connotation. In this context, information withheld from the public in the name of
secrecy has been associated with covering up governmental wrongdoing and illegal
activities. Secrecy at the upper levels of intelligence seems to run Contrary to democratic
ideals, because agencies like the CIA can cover up immoral acts under the guise of
“protecting national security”. Adding credence to this theory, a Pew Research poll in
2018 found that 74% of Americans view governmental transparency as a very important
part of democracy.2
Secrecy in intelligence is necessary, despite the possible consequences of overclassification. It is difficult for those outside the intelligence bubble to reconcile the
differences between the level of secrecy that those organizations need to evaluate and
respond to threats and the level of secrecy that citizens need to confirm that democratic
ideals and ethics are being upheld. In order to allow these two groups to coexist without

2

“Views of American Democratic Values and principles,” Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy, April 26,
2018. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/04/26/2-views-of-american-democratic-values-and-principles/
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conflict, intelligence agencies must earn and maintain the trust of their constituents. In
turn, constituents must recognize the level of threats that intelligence agencies respond
to every day and realize the need for secrecy in these situations. Despite pledges by
directors to increase transparency in intelligence agencies over the years, the results of
these efforts have failed to impress.3 Moreover, as documents become declassified or
leaked, it is clear that intelligence agencies, and the CIA specifically, have failed to
uphold their end of the bargain. There have been countless violations of democratic
ideals that were swept under the rug in the past, which has severely undermined trust in
the organization today.
The CIA has been accused of numerous abuses of power by multiple scholars,
going back to its inception in 1947. Although the organization managed to avoid serious
catastrophe for a couple decades, a series of scandals in the early 1970s began a saga of
Congressional committees and newspaper scrutiny that promised to bring further
oversight to the secretive group. At the time, the CIA was already facing serious
accusations of spying on American citizens using plainclothes Army intelligence
operatives. These accusations were further investigated by Senator Sam Ervin in 1973,
and the revelations were published in more than 40 newspapers around the US. In 1974,
the hammer fell: a New York Times article by Seymour Hersh found that the CIA had
been involved in abuses ranging from attempted assassinations of foreign leaders to
domestic spying on at least 10,000 US citizens.4 Former Director of Covert Intelligence
(DCI) James Schlesinger originally compiled the internal documents, dubbed the

3

Nick Hopkins, “Former NSA chief: Western intelligence agencies must be more transparent,” The Guardian,
September 30, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/30/nsa-director-intelligence-public-support
4
Seymour M. Hersh, “Huge C.I.A. operation reported in U.S. against antiwar forces, other dissidents in Nixon
years,” New York Times, December 22, 1974, pp. 1–27.
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“Family Jewels”, in response to public outcry over Watergate, which was carried out by a
group of burglars that included two former CIA officers.5 The next year, the so-called
“Year of Intelligence” promised to finally expose CIA wrongdoing through a series of
Congressional and presidential investigations.
The Senate (Church Committee), House of Representatives (Pike Committee) and
the White House (Rockefeller Commission) all launched probes into the CIA and its
intelligence counterparts, including the FBI, NSA, and IRS. These investigations
uncovered some of the most infamous CIA programs: Operation MKULTRA, which used
Americans as test subjects for mind control experiments; COINTELPRO, which
surveilled American civil rights and political organizations without their knowledge; and
the aforementioned “Family Jewels”. From the Family Jewels memos came another
shocking allegation: the CIA had recruited journalists to manipulate news media and
disseminate propaganda around the world. This program, referred to as Operation
Mockingbird, would fuel theories that the CIA had control over domestic US news
sources and their publishing output for years to come.
In his doctoral thesis, “The CIA & the cult of secrecy”, David McCarthy argues
that in order to fully comprehend the impact of the events of 1975 on the US intelligence
community, we must also consider what was going on outside Congress.6 One of these
events was a 1973 birthday party for Norman Mailer, a prominent author and politician,
who mentioned in the invitations that he would be “making an announcement of

5

Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, “CIA to Air Decades of Its Dirty Laundry,” Washington Post, June 22, 2007,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/21/AR2007062102434_pf.html
6
David S. McCarthy, “The CIA & the cult of secrecy,” PhD diss., (College of William and Mary, 2008).
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3126&context=etd
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national importance” that evening.7 However, by the time he got up for his speech, he
was too drunk to make much sense at all, and many left without understanding what he
was trying to say.8 He clarified the situation in a later press conference: he wanted a sort
of ‘people’s intelligence’ called the Fifth Estate, which would act as a democratic
watchdog for the FBI and CIA, who were experiencing rapidly growing public relations
issues as the Watergate conspiracy was uncovered by investigative journalists.9 He also
suggested that the Fourth Estate, or the media, was unable to act effectively in this role
because each big story required years of detailed investigative work to prove and even
longer to publish.10 Although he acknowledged that the Fourth and Fifth Estates could
eventually work together, “the walled-in eyes of the poisoned Fourth” could not answer
his central question: “Is our history developing into a string of connected conspiracies,
or is there less ground finally for our national paranoia than any have supposed?” 11
Unbeknownst to Mailer, one such organization already existed. A group of three
former intelligence officers were behind the Committee for Action/Research on the
Intelligence Community (CARIC) and published a magazine, Counter-Spy, that printed
names and stations of intelligence officials implicated in the conspiracies that CARIC
uncovered. This was a rarity, both because of the secrecy surrounding that information
and because of the unwillingness to hold powerful government institutions accountable
for fear of legal repercussions. Although the group published some conspiratorial beliefs

7

Hilary Mills, Mailer: A Biography (New York:McGraw-Hill, 1984), 389.
Sally Quinn, “Norman Mailer Turns 50,” Washington Post, February 7, 1973, B7.
9
"Mailer Clarifies His 'Fifth Estate': Says Its Goals and Structure Are Still Not Decided On," New York Times,
February 7, 1973, 84. https://www.nytimes.com/1973/02/07/archives/mailer-clarifies-his-fifth-estate-says-its-goalsand-structure-are.html
10
McCarthy, “The CIA & the cult of secrecy,” 18-19.
11
Norman Mailer, “The Morning After”, New York Times Book Review, March 11, 1973.
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/03/11/archives/the-morning-after-the-guest-word-morning-after.html
8
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that did not stand the test of time,12 they described other programs that certainly did
happen, including Operation Phoenix, a counter-insurgency program in Vietnam that
the group believed operated as “a systematic murder program”.13 The winter 1975
edition of Counter-Spy proved to be their most famous: in that issue, they identified
over 100 suspected CIA station chiefs around the world.14 On page 26, a short listing
identified Richard S. Welch as the station chief in Lima, Peru.
On December 23, 1975, Welch was gunned down by terrorists in Athens, Greece,
where he was actually serving as station chief. Although Counter-Spy was not in every
American’s living room, some readers wondered what purpose the identification of
undercover operatives served other than to encourage violence against them. The
magazine’s editors claimed that they were attempting to force the CIA to withdraw their
employees, which was a necessary step to abolishing covert action abroad. 15 However,
the radical nature of this attempt was put under the microscope after the Fifth Estate
penned an open letter in the days following the assassination of Welch, which read, in
part, "if anyone is to blame for Mr. Welch's death it is the C.I.A. that sent him there to
spy, perhaps even to intervene, in the affairs of the Greek Government."16 The CIA and
its PR machine immediately responded, with DCI William Colby saying that the
magazine had “issued a statement which can only be called a shocking attempt to use
the death of a dedicated American as fuel for its irresponsible and paranoic [sic] attack

12

“Terrorist groups will either be formed or manipulated to justify the designs of those persons who have made
security their lives.” Counter-Spy 1 (June 1974): 2.
13
“Pacification: The 100 Year Flight of the Phoenix,” Counter-Spy 1 (May 1973): 21.
14
“Chiefs of Station: Who’s Who and What They Do,” Counter-Spy 2 (Winter 1975): 23.
15
McCarthy, “The CIA & the cult of secrecy,” 32.
16
“C.I.A. Blamed for Death,” New York Times, December 25, 1975, 3.
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/12/25/archives/cia-blamed-for-death.html
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on other Americans serving their country here and abroad."17 Although the magazine
would withstand the initial attacks, there were important casualties: Mailer withdrew
his support for the publication after they lost tax-exempt status, the original editors left
one by one, and in 1982, with the death of Richard S. Welch in mind, Congress passed
the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which made it illegal to print the names of
intelligence operatives. Two years later, the magazine was published for the last time.
Despite all of this, Counter-Spy proved to be a very impactful publication. For the
first time, it was the citizens who were surveilling the CIA, and not the other way
around. Colby and other high-level officials were also forced to answer tough questions
about how easy it was for "a scruffy group of anti-CIA activists," as he called them, to
identify undercover operatives who were not supposed to be identifiable.18 Eventually,
the CIA would ‘embrace’ more Congressional oversight, but never would they agree to
what the editors at Counter-Spy pushed for: an end to covert action due to the abuses
that intelligence services had engaged in previously. In fact, they actively fought against
it, mainly with effective public relations strategies that convinced politicians and the
American public alike that covert action and secrecy were necessary to ensure safety at
home.
Established in 1977, the CIA Office of Public Affairs sought to minimize the
damage that had been done to the CIA’s public image during the “Year of Intelligence”,
ostensibly through honest public outreach. However, McCarthy argued that the agency
used public relations mainly to divert the public’s attention from the negative media

17

Ibid.
William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978),
450.
18
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coverage they received.19 The CIA would selectively declassify evidence and documents
that portrayed their actions in a positive light while keeping other information under
wraps, under the guise of protecting their valuable ‘culture of secrecy’.20 They also
utilized memoirs that cast the agency in a favorable view, like Colby’s Honorable Men,
and the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (ARIO) provided additional support
that bolstered the CIA’s image.21 The organization also became more involved in
Hollywood, lending their expertise to a number of movies and television shows that
portrayed the secretive world of the CIA as one with numerous successes and
praiseworthy actions on behalf of agency operatives.22 Ultimately, these strategies would
be “remarkably effective,” allowing the agency freedom to write its own history.23

David S. McCarthy, “Selling the CIA: Public Relations and the Culture of Secrecy” (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2018), pp. 8-129.
20
Ibid., 129.
21
Ibid., pp. 11-36.
22
Ibid., pp. 57-76.
23
Ibid., 123.
19
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The Dark Alliance
Chapter I
Gary Webb was born in Corona, California, on August 31, 1955.24 He began his
journalism career writing music reviews for the IUPUI school newspaper, The
Sagamore.25 Shortly thereafter, he moved to Cincinnati and got a job writing for the
Kentucky Post, a smaller affiliate of the Cincinnati Post.26 Webb covered many
noteworthy stories during his time at the Post and, later on, the Cleveland Plain Dealer
quickly establishing a reputation as a hard-hitting investigative reporter with a penchant
for misleading headlines.27 Two stories that he wrote during his time at the Plain Dealer
resulted in multimillion dollar libel settlements, even though none of the facts of either
story were proven false; the headlines, instead, were deemed misleading and implied
more wrongdoing than what actually occurred.28
In 1988, Webb moved on to the San Jose Mercury News, where he began work as
a state government correspondent in Sacramento.29 By this point, Webb had become a
talented researcher and tenacious reporter, although it seemed that he quickly and
definitively identified the good guys and bad guys in each story that he wrote, according
to those who worked with him.30 “That kind of innate sense of fairness didn’t come
naturally to Gary,” said Scott Herhold, his former editor at the Mercury News. “He was

24

Nick Schou, Kill The Messenger: How the CIA’s Crack Cocaine Controversy Destroyed Gary Webb (Nation
Books, 2006), 13.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., 29.
27
Ibid., pp. 29-51.
28
Ibid., 48.
29
Ibid., 52-54.
30
Schou, Kill the Messenger, 58.
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a crusader.”31 That crusader mentality meant that he was often at loggerheads with
other editors and reporters at the paper, and his tendency to draw sweeping conclusions
without the requisite body of evidence would later damage his credibility. In 1995, Webb
was contacted by Coral Baca, a woman whose boyfriend, Rafael Cornejo, was targeted by
the asset forfeiture program established during the Reagan administration by the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986. Baca believed that the government had set Cornejo up on bogus
charges that allowed them to seize his house and sell it. A drug dealer believing that they
were innocent was not news, though, and Webb was initially hesitant to pursue the
story.32 That lasted until a phone call with Baca, in which she mentioned something that
would catapult Gary Webb into the national spotlight just a few years later. “There’s
something about Rafael’s case that I don’t think you would have done before,” she said.
“One of the government’s witnesses is a guy who used to work with the CIA selling
drugs.”33

31

Ibid., 60.
Ibid., 63.
33
Ibid.
32
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Chapter II
The connections between Rafael Cornejo, drugs, and the CIA cannot be adequately
understood without a knowledge of the Reagan administration and its involvement in
the covert regime change in Nicaragua. Following the Nicaraguan Revolution, which
resulted in the bloody overthrow of the Somoza family political dynasty in 1979, the
Marxist Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction, a leftist coalition government,
came into power.34 The Reagan administration considered the Sandinistas to be a threat
to the American southern border,35 and Reagan would later argue in his 1985 State of
the Union address that “We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—
on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression
and secure rights which have been ours from birth."36 Under the guidance of the Reagan
Doctrine, as this idea would later be known, the U.S. government began providing arms,
clothing and military supervision to a loosely affiliated group of rebel fighters, known as
Contras.37
The Contras were made up of three distinct elements of Nicaraguan society. Some
were former Nicaraguan National Guardsmen, who had worked for the Somozan
government before its downfall after the civil war.38 Others were anti-Somozistan
activists who became disillusioned with the new government’s policy making. 39 A third

34

Lee H. Hamilton, et al., "Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair,”
November 17, 1987, 25. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit/mode/2up
35
John A. Thompson, “The Exaggeration of American Vulnerability: An Anatomy of Tradition,” Diplomatic
History 16, no. 1 (Winter 1992): p. 33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24912171
36
Chester Pach, “The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no.
1 (March 2006): p. 75. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552748?seq=1
37
Hamilton, “Report Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair,” 3.
38
Ibid., 29.
39
Ibid.
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group was made up of ordinary Nicaraguans, who had managed to survive the
revolution and opposed the Sandinistas.40
The first instance of covert US monetary aid to the group came in 1982, when
Reagan signed the top secret National Security Decision Directive 17, which provided
$19 million for the CIA to recruit and train Contra fighters.41 These activities were the
most ambitious paramilitary undertaking that the CIA had attempted in a decade, and
initially the Reagan administration found little support from Congress and the public for
US involvement in Nicaragua.42 $24 million was approved by Congress in 1984 to
continue Nicaraguan operations, but after a year in which the Contras failed to secure
popular support in the country or win major military victories, funds for Contras were
cut off with the ratification of the third Boland amendment, which prohibited US
assistance to the group.43 Still, in Washington, Reagan and the Heritage Foundation
both expressed support for the Contras, who they believed could counter the spread of
Soviet influence in South America.44
Around this same time, the first news reports of CIA involvement in Nicaraguan
drug dealing began to come out. An Associated Press article published in 1985 stated
that US government officials and American volunteers witnessed cocaine trafficking at
clandestine airports in northern Costa Rica, which were then transported to other points
around the country before being shipped to the U.S.45 Officials had begun receiving

40

Ibid.
NSDD – National Security Decision Directives – Reagan Administration, May 30, 2008.
https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-17.pdf
42
Hamilton, “Report Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair,” 33.
43
Ibid., 3.
44
Michael Johns, “The Lessons of Afghanistan,” Policy Review (March 1987): pp. 32-35.
45
Brian Barger and Robert Parry, “Reports Link Nicaraguan Rebels to Cocaine Trafficking,” Associated Press,
December 20, 1985. https://apnews.com/article/c69eaf370de9884f907a39efd90337d3
41
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“reliable” reports of drug trafficking in 1984, around the time when Congress officially
cut off aid to the rebel forces.46 Among the allegations were those by an unnamed Contra
leader in Costa Rica, who said that he was paid $50,000 by Colombian cocaine
traffickers to help transport 100 kilograms, with the money going back to the rebel
groups to aid their war with the Nicaraguan government.47 The rebel leader requested
another $50,000 from the US government in exchange for the smugglers.48 That
request was denied, and the Colombian operation eventually took place without any
arrests.49 Later that year, a CIA-prepared National Intelligence Estimate identified a
commander with the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE), one of the largest
Contra groups receiving US aid, who spent $250,000 in profits from cocaine smuggling
on a helicopter and an arms shipment.50 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials knew
about drug smuggling activity in northern Costa Rica, but had not associated them with
any political organization.
The indifference towards these allegations by the CIA and DEA is puzzling,
especially so because the Reagan administration placed such an emphasis on Nancy
Reagan’s “Just Say No” initiative, which sought to reduce the use of illegal drugs. It is
strange that at the same time that Reagan was championing “shortages of marijuana”
and almost $250 million in asset forfeitures by drug dealers back in the US, the DEA did
not investigate accusations of government-backed forces transporting drugs into the

46

Ibid.
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
47

Miller 17
country.51 The DEA’s response at the time was that they were focusing their efforts on
the drug-producing countries of Latin America instead of places like Costa Rica, who
merely functioned as stops on the route into the US.52 “We are not aware of any evidence
to support those charges,” added US State Department deputy spokesman Charles
Redman.53 Meanwhile, Oliver North, a National Security Council (NSC) aide charged
with running covert Contra operations, continued to search for ways to fund the loosely
affiliated group despite the passage of the Boland amendment. Between 1984 and 1986,
North was able to funnel almost $37 million dollars to rebel forces by way of private
donors and third countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.54 North’s Iran dealings were
discovered later in 1986; the Iran-Contra affair, as it is known now, saw senior officials
in the Reagan administration sell weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of several
hostages, with a portion of the profits from each sale going back to the Contras.55
Despite the lack of involvement in drug investigations by the CIA and DEA, the
FBI commissioned a probe into illicit activities by the Contras.56 In the months leading
up to April of 1986, twelve supporters of the Contra movement were questioned in
relation to the drug smuggling allegations and reports of possible illegal shipments of
arms from the US to rebel forces based in Honduras and Costa Rica.57 In fact, the FBI
had launched multiple investigations since 1984, including one into Lt. Col. North, the

51

Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on the campaign against drug abuse,” 1986.
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-campaign-against-drug-abuse
52
Barger and Parry, “Reports Link Nicaraguan Rebels to Cocaine Trafficking,” 1985.
53
Ibid.
54
Hamilton, “Report Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair,” 4.
55
“The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On,” National Security Archive (George Washington University), November
24, 2006. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/
56
Brian Barger and Robert Parry, “FBI Reportedly Probes Contras on Drugs, Guns,” Associated Press, April 10,
1986. https://apnews.com/article/4c28d082f93d4d08d4fc2b41a968a1f4
57
Ibid.
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White House official who led Contra operations after Congress prohibited US aid to the
Contras.58 The probe came at a particularly sensitive time for the Reagan
administration, which was trying to pass a $100 million aid package for the Contras that
included a re-establishment of military aid by Congress.59 Knowing that the publication
of this information would damage their chances of passing the bill, the administration
published a report of their own on the Contra-cocaine connections. The report
acknowledged that there was “evidence of a limited number of incidents in which known
drug traffickers have tried to establish connections with Nicaraguan resistance groups,”
but that these incidents “took place during the period when the resistance was receiving
no U.S. funding and was particularly hard pressed for financial support.”60
In response to these allegations, which were by this time public knowledge,
Senators John Kerry and Christopher Dodd requested in April 1986 that hearings on the
subject of Contra involvement in drug trafficking be conducted by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International
Operations. Once approved, the Kerry Committee, as it would become better known,
investigated drug trafficking not only in Nicaragua, but in other South American and
Caribbean countries as well. In October of 1986, Kerry’s office released a report
outlining the illegal activities that Lt. Col. Oliver North engaged in, asserting that he had
set up a “private network” of smugglers that illegally delivered arms to Contra rebels.61

58

Ibid.
Ibid.
60
“US Concedes Contras Linked to Drugs, But Denies Leadership Involved,” Associated Press, April 17, 1986.
https://apnews.com/article/bb7394e75625a363b8c0bf9b0d6cf969
61
“White House Official Linked to Arms Deliveries to Contras,” New York Times, October 15, 1986, A6.
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/15/world/white-house-official-linked-to-arms-deliveries-toContras.html?n=Top%2FReference%2FTimes+Topics%2FPeople%2FK%2FKerry%2C+John
59
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After three years of hearings, the Kerry Committee report was released in April 1989.
The findings of the report would later fuel Gary Webb’s interest in the Dark Alliance
series. Three of the findings were particularly relevant to that reporting, and are
outlined below.
✥
“The war in Central America contributed to weakening an already inadequate law
enforcement capability which was exploited easily by a variety of mercenaries, pilots
and cartel members involved in drug smuggling.”62
✥
Although the committee found no evidence that Contra leaders engaged in drug
smuggling themselves, they did agree that there was “substantial evidence” of trafficking
through war zones in Nicaragua from almost all facets of the combat apparatus,
including mercenaries, pilots, Contras and Contra sympathizers.63 Even more damning,
there was evidence of US officials turning a blind eye to these acts, despite knowing that
the war effort was being supported by proceeds from drug sales.64 Payments totaling
$806,000 were made to known narcotics smugglers in order to get humanitarian
supplies to the Contras; some of these smugglers had already been indicted on drugrelated charges, while others were under active investigation.65

62

Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy, 1989, 136.
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
65
GAO Analysis of NHAO Accounts, final figures provided by Department of State to the Subcommittee on
Narcotics, Terrorism and International Operations, 1989. In Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy, 1989, 43.
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000014976124&view=1up&seq=148&skin=2021
63
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The relationship between the drug smugglers and Contras appeared to be
pragmatic. The strength of the Contra forces’ military was deeply tied to US assistance,
and for many fighters, the aid they received was the difference between life and death on
the battlefield.66 Meanwhile, the traffickers had the financial resources and necessary
transportation to get just about anything where it needed to go, whether that be drugs or
medical equipment or small arms. What they did not have was a way of legally
transporting those drugs and arms to where they needed to go, or a cover for those
activities, until the US federal government provided them with both. Pilots, who had
previously covered up their drug shipments with mixed loads of arms, eventually began
refueling at Contra airstrips even when their loads only contained drugs because they
knew that law enforcement would not check their cargo since activities related to the
war were “protected”.67 Even if they were not, it may not have mattered in some
situations; for example, the airstrips in northern Costa Rica that the smugglers exploited
had a police force of 50 “underpaid, easily bought… men to cover 400 kilometers
maybe.”68 Some traffickers with indictments in the US looked to use contributions to the
Contras as a get-out-of-jail-free card, while others simply saw it as another way to
promote business.69 On the American end, at least one agency of the federal government
received information about these smuggling actions as they were happening or
immediately afterwards, yet the traffickers rarely faced consequences.
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Despite assurances from the federal government to the Contrary, it seems that a
large fraction of the Contras profited from drugs. In fact, CIA Central American Task
Force chief Alan Fiers said during questioning that “it is not a couple of people (engaged
in drug trafficking). It is a lot of people.”70 Later, while answering a question about Eden
Pastora, a former Sandinista leader who eventually broke off to form the ARDE, Fiers
noted that, “[w]e knew that everybody around Pastora was involved in cocaine... His
staff and friends [redacted] they were drug smugglers or involved in drug smuggling.”71
✥
“There are serious questions as to whether or not US officials involved in Central
America failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war against
Nicaragua.”72
✥
One common underlying theme of the entire investigation was that the US government
valued a successful outcome in the war in Nicaragua more highly than a successful “War
on Drugs”. This theme was especially apparent at a meeting between a group of
committee members and representatives from the Justice Department, DEA, CIA, FBI
and State Department. They met to discuss alleged Neutrality Act violations, gun
running and drug trafficking by organizations operating on the Southern Front of the
conflict. In the days leading up to the meeting, Justice Department officials denied the
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allegations, saying that “the FBI had conducted an inquiry into all of these charges and
none of them have any substance."73 Once at the meeting, however, Justice Department
officials Contradicted those public statements, asserting that the statements were
“inaccurate” and that there were ongoing investigations into the Neutrality Act
allegations.74 Meanwhile, at the same meeting, the CIA denied any Neutrality Act
violations occurred, citing classified documents that they would not share with the
committee.75 However, the FBI had, by that point, amassed a large amount of evidence
confirming those violations, including admissions from the suspected criminals.76
Whether those lies were intentional or a product of limited communication between
these organizations is unclear, but the ordeal certainly contributed to heightened
mistrust of intelligence services at the time. If they could not truthfully answer these
questions in front of a Congressional committee, why would they be expected to do so in
front of the American public?
This was not the only finding from the investigation that supported the idea that
the US avoided prosecuting drug-related crimes in order to preserve the Contra war.
Manuel Noriega, who was the de facto head of the Panamanian government during the
war, had been supplying Contra fighters with military assistance in exchange for what
essentially amounted to immunity from the CIA.77 When the DEA attempted to indict
him on drug trafficking charges in 1971, which they had been investigating since the
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1960s, the CIA intervened and prevented the indictment.78 Eventually, after a CIA pilot
carrying arms and classified documents to Nicaragua was shot down and the
connections between the CIA and Noriega began to come out, the organization finally
determined that its relationship with Noriega was a PR liability and gave the DEA
permission to seek an indictment, which it successfully did in 1989.79
✥
“A primary focus of the U.S. drug effort must be on the major narcotics trafficking
organizations located in foreign havens. Law enforcement efforts concentrated on the
pusher in the streets, the distributor in the U.S. and interdiction at our border have
failed to stem the flow of drugs into this country.”80
✥
Although the War on Drugs began during Richard Nixon’s presidency with the passage
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, it was not until
the Reagan administration that harsher penalties, like the mandatory minimum
sentencing for drug offenders, were imposed. This was the result of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 and Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which also allowed police
to impose harsher penalties for many drugs, including crack cocaine and marijuana
possession, allocated 1.7 billion dollars to fight drugs, and established guidelines and
procedures for civil asset forfeiture.81 Bipartisan support for reducing the drug trade in
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the US allowed the FBI’s drug enforcement units to receive a 1087% increase in their
budget over four years from 1980 to 1984.82 The deaths of Len Bias, a Maryland
standout basketball player who overdosed on crack cocaine two days after being drafted
second overall in the NBA draft by the Boston Celtics, and NFL Defensive Rookie of the
Year Don Rogers a week later from another cocaine overdose, contributed to heightened
awareness of a burgeoning epidemic of crack cocaine and increased support for these
harsher penalties.83
With substantially increased funding and a friendly administration, authorities
began to tally record numbers of drug arrests and seizures, which were sometimes
publicly announced by Reagan himself.84 However, these busts were largely of street
dealers and domestic distributors in the US, allowing the cartels and large suppliers
outside the country to simply replace the seller without interruption to their daily
activities. Moreover, the 1986 legislation instituted much stricter penalties for drug
users, and some historians argue that these penalties disproportionately affected
African-Americans.85 Despite these efforts to stop the trafficking of drugs into America,
crack and other drugs continued to be smuggled across the Southern border. Witnesses
described futile interdiction efforts there as “plugging a funnel from the wide end.” 86
Because of these failing policies, which seemed to punish drug users and lowlevel members of drug trafficking organizations more than those running the operation,
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the Kerry report recommended that a “significant portion of the federal effort” go
towards mutual legal assistance treaties and sanctions for foreign drug havens, which
were both included in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.87 The treaties would allow the
US government to extradite drug traffickers more efficiently and monitor suspected
money-laundering activity. The sanctions would show foreign officials that the US was
serious about cracking down on the drug problem. Ultimately, none of these solutions
were very effective; although adolescent drug use may have declined as a result of the
War on Drugs,88 the inability to take drugs off of the street in meaningful numbers
combined with a rapidly increasing prison population meant that Reagan’s anti-drug
policy was widely viewed as a failure.89 Meanwhile, cartels continued to profit from
across the border, while people like Rafael Cornejo took the fall in the US.
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Chapter III
The witness to Cornejo’s alleged crimes was named Oscar Blandón. After meeting with
Baca and examining FBI and DEA documents that Cornejo’s lawyers had obtained
through discovery, Webb learned that Blandón was part of a well-off Nicaraguan family
that fled the country for the US when the Sandinistas took over.90 Afterwards, like many
exiled Nicaraguans, he became a supporter of the Contras.91 To supplant his fundraising,
Blandón began selling cocaine in the 1980s as a result of a friendly relationship with
Norwin Meneses, a large-scale trafficker who lived in San Francisco.92 Meneses was also
sympathetic to the Contras, and helped Blandón get his operation off the ground; by
1986, he was a significant drug dealer in Los Angeles and elsewhere.93 By that time, his
drug-related activities had caught the eye of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
department (LACSD), who worked with the FBI and DEA to bust his drug ring. When
the raid was executed, however, police found negligible amounts of drugs at his
residence, and charges were ultimately dropped.94
After that, Blandón moved to Florida, and it appeared that he was done dealing
drugs. A joint effort from the FBI, DEA and IRS to investigate Blandón’s drug trafficking
ring in 1987 was unsuccessful for that reason and a number of others, including a lack of
resources and coordination between the law enforcement agencies.95 In the Dark
Alliance, Webb implied that Blandón may have been tipped off by the CIA about the
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search warrants.96 This was because Ronald Lister, who also had his home searched
during the failed raid, made statements to LACSD suggesting that his drug-related
activities were protected by the CIA.97 A review by the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) after the articles were published challenged this assertion, arguing that changes in
Blandón’s activities before the raid were because he correctly believed he was under
investigation, and that Lister’s comments were made because he “thought such claims
would be helpful rather than because they were true.”98 Whatever the case, Blandón laid
low in Florida for a few years before moving back to California in 1990 and returning to
drug trafficking. That same year, another federal investigation into Blandón began, this
time of his drug dealings in San Diego, and in May 1992 he was indicted for conspiracy
to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.99 In a motion filed against Blandón during
the trial, Assistant U.S. Attorney L.J. O’Neale wrote that Blandón and Jairo Meneses
were responsible for an additional 764 kilos of cocaine that were seized in Nicaragua in
1991.100 Despite these facts, in addition to the government’s own admission that
Blandón and the Meneses family were large-scale drug traffickers, a plea deal was
arranged so that Blandón would only serve 48 months in prison in exchange for
cooperation with U.S. authorities.101 He would serve 28 months before being released.
As a free man, he began working as an informant with the DEA.
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This sentence was viewed as extremely lenient by Webb, who argued that his
admissions would have meant a life sentence for others.102 After the 1986 Anti-Drug
Abuse Act was passed, the penalty for possession of 5 grams of crack cocaine, or 500
grams of powder cocaine, was 5 years without parole. Blandón was linked to an
exponentially larger amount, yet received preferential treatment, which Webb alleged
was due to special consideration he received because of his contributions to the
Contras.103 He also pointed to Blandón’s acquisition of a green card in 1994, which
should not have been possible given his conviction for felony drug trafficking, as more
evidence that the government had a special interest in Blandón.104 Curious as to why
Blandón and Meneses were not mentioned in the Kerry committee report, Webb
contacted Jack Blum, who was Kerry’s chief prosecutor during the investigations.105
Blum said that he remembered the name, but that Reagan’s Justice Department
effectively stonewalled the investigators.106 “[A]fter our experiences with Justice… we
mainly concentrated on cocaine coming into the East,” Blum said.107 He was also critical
of press coverage of the committee hearings: “We would have a day of hearings and he
White House would call reporters and say, ‘This is insane stuff – don’t listen to them,’
and by and large the press bought it,” he said. “The coverage stunk.”108
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This would not be the last time that the mainstream media or the federal
government attempted to minimize reporting on the Contras. Robert Parry, who had
written stories for the Associated Press about the external drug activities of the Contras,
told Webb that after he and his coauthor Brian Barger published the first story alleging
that the CIA knew of Contra drug trafficking activities, they were both personally
attacked by the Reagan administration and other newspapers.109 “The most aggressive
attacks came from the news media,” he said, noting that the Washington Times claimed
the story had been disproved, with other news organizations “piling on” afterwards. 110
Despite the obvious radioactivity of the story, Webb pressed on. All he needed was direct
evidence of Blandón selling cocaine to support the CIA-backed Contras to begin writing
his story. Another question needed to be answered, too: who ended up doing the drugs
that Blandón supplied?
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Chapter IV
Webb got his answers during the trial of “Freeway” Ricky Ross. Ross was a former tennis
prodigy who turned to selling cocaine because he was illiterate, and therefore unable to
receive a scholarship to play in college.111 After initially selling small amounts of cocaine,
Ross was introduced to Ivan Arguellas, a large-scale supplier who allowed Ross to deal
in ounces of cocaine instead of grams.112 Arguellas was shot in the back and paralyzed
just eight months later, and his brother-in-law Henry Corrales took over the business. It
was then that Blandón, who had heard tell of the large amounts of cocaine that Ross had
been moving, offered to supply Corrales with cocaine for a fifty-fifty split of the
profits.113 Once Corrales bowed out of drug dealing a few months later, Blandón and
Ross began dealing directly with each other. Through his relationship with Blandón,
Ross was introduced to Norwin Meneses, who supplied Blandón with high-quality,
cheap Nicaraguan cocaine that Ross could sell on the streets of South Central LA. 114
Ross quickly began making a fortune off of selling cocaine to Crips and Bloods in
Los Angeles, and by 1982 was making up to three million dollars per day.115 Ross
expanded his business to cities all over the US, including Cincinnati, where he would
eventually be arrested in 1988 after drug agents traced a load of cocaine intercepted in
New Mexico back to him.116 His conviction meant he would serve a mandatory 10-year
sentence, which he began serving in 1990.117 However, around the same time, a scandal
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hit the LACSD and its elite narcotics division, and officers were accused of a range of
violations including beating suspects, stealing drug money, and planting evidence. 118 In
exchange for testifying for the government, Ross’s sentence was reduced to four years
and nine months, and he was released on parole in October 1994.119
His freedom did not last for long. While Ross was in prison, his old supplier
Blandón had been preparing for his first assignment: a ‘reverse sting’ of Ross, which
meant that the government would supply Blandón with cocaine and Ross would pay for
the drugs.120 Shortly after Ross’s release, he was contacted by Blandón, who asked if
Ross would be able to buy 100 kilos of cocaine from him. Ross was hauling trash for a
living at the time and was behind on payments for a theater in South Central LA that he
was attempting to convert into a youth center, so he initially refused. 121 Blandón
countered with the option for Ross to find a buyer in exchange for a $300,000
commission, which he successfully did. On March 2, 1995, Ross went to pick up a car,
laden with 100 kilos of the DEA’s cocaine, in a parking lot.122 Police immediately
surrounded him, and after a brief car chase, he was arrested. Blandón earned $45,500
in government rewards for his help in catching Ross.123
Ross faced a penalty of life without parole for his role in his latest dealing with
Blandón.124 Webb, during his research on Blandón, was informed that he would be
testifying against Ross in his upcoming trial and contacted Alan Fenster, Ross’s
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attorney, to see what he knew about Blandón.125 Fenster put Webb in touch with Ross,
and Webb arranged to meet with both men in San Diego.126 When Webb told them of his
evidence that Blandón was funding the Contra effort with proceeds from his cocaine
sales, Ross laughed. “They said I sold dope all over,” he said, “but man, I know he done
sold ten times more than me.”127 Shortly thereafter, Webb went to Nicaragua with Georg
Hodel, a Swiss journalist, intent on getting information from Norwin Meneses. Meneses
was happy to talk to Webb and described his activities with the Contras. He said that he
began raising money for them in the early 1980s after a meeting with Enrique
Bermudez, the leader of the FDN at the time.128 Bermudez was also a CIA asset at the
time, acting as one of the Reagan administration’s primary contacts within the
Contras.129 He reminisced about living a free life in the US, despite DEA records that
Webb had collected showing that Meneses was implicated in no less than 45
investigations between 1974 and 1996.130 Armed with this information, Webb and
Fenster devised a series of questions to ask Blandón while on the stand, hoping that he
would confess to his Contra links under oath.
✥
Fenster: So you were running his (Meneses) Los Angeles operation, isn't that correct?
Blandón: Yes. Now remember, we were running, just ... whatever we were running in
L.A., it goes ... the profit was going to the Contra revolution. I don't know ...
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F: I'm glad you reminded me of that.

Fenster: He (Meneses) said, "Hey, I'm selling drugs and I want you to help me" ...
Blandón: Yes.
F: ...in so many words. Is that right?
B: To raise the money for the Contra revolution.

After acknowledging that he met with Bermudez and Meneses to discuss Contra
fundraising efforts, Blandón turned to his translator:
Translator: "There is a saying that the ends justify the means."
Blandón: And that's what Mr. Bermudez told us in Honduras. OK? So we started
raising money for the Contra revolution.

Fenster: When you met with Mr. Bermudez, did you meet also with members of the
United States government?
Blandón: No sir.
F: He was already working for the United States government when you met him, isn't
that correct?
Assistant US Attorney L.J. O'Neale, representing Blandón: Object...
Judge Marilyn L. Huff: Let me sustain the objection at this point.
✥
With that, Webb had all he needed. He could trace the flow of cocaine from Nicaragua
all the way to predominantly black neighborhoods in South Central LA. He had direct
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evidence, corroborated by sworn testimony, that the profits from those sales were
funneled back to Contra forces in Nicaragua. That testimony also showed that a CIA
asset was present when those decisions were made, but no action against the sales was
taken by the CIA. In fact, most of the evidence that he had, albeit circumstantial, pointed
towards the idea that those actions were protected by the CIA, possibly for the same
reasons that Blandón got involved in the first place: “the ends justify the means.”
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Chapter V
The first installment of The Dark Alliance was published on August 18, 1996, after
months of editing and rewriting. It appeared both in the San Jose Mercury News and
online, where readers could also find links to Webb’s documents and recordings of the
testimony that he cited. The lede read as follows:

“FOR THE BETTER PART of a decade, a San Francisco Bay Area
drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods street gangs of
Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug profits to a Latin
American guerrilla army run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
a Mercury News investigation has found.”131

The phrases “tons of cocaine” and “millions in drug profits” would be Webb’s
undoing. Although he and his editors certainly may have believed it, there was no
evidence in the story that proved those assertions. Although Blandón admitted that he
sold cocaine on behalf of the Contras, there was no way to tell just how much of the
profits ended up back in Nicaragua and how much stayed in Blandón’s bank account.
When the OIG reviewed intelligence reports on Blandón and Meneses, they concluded
that their role within the Contras was “marginal” and they likely contributed a small
fraction of the total proceeds they made off of cocaine.132 The next sentence didn’t do
Webb any favors, either: “This drug network opened the first pipeline between
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Colombia's cocaine cartels and the black neighborhoods of Los Angeles, a city now
known as the ‘crack’ capital of the world.”133 Once again, although Webb may have
believed it to be true, there was no way to prove that Blandón and Meneses were the first
to introduce crack to Los Angeles, and nothing in the story supported the claim. In his
pursuit of a dramatic headline, Webb had exaggerated many of the facts of a story that
needed no exaggeration. He sought to tie the CIA directly to these drug traffickers when
there was ultimately no proof that anyone employed by the agency participated in, or
knew about, Blandón and Meneses’ drug dealing. When combined with the fact that the
veracity of the story hinged on the trustworthiness of three drug dealers, it made Webb a
vulnerable target for anyone eager to discredit his reporting.
Over the next two days, the remainder of the story was published. The second
installment profiled Blandón and Ross, while the third discussed the huge disparity in
federal sentencing guidelines for crack versus powder cocaine and the resulting influx of
inner-city, mostly African-American people residents into prisons. At first, there was not
much of a reaction to the stories; after all, the Mercury News was still a regional paper,
and the DNC and RNC were both coming up that week.134 Then, it took off, largely
thanks to the online version of the article, which caused visits to the Mercury News
website to go from a couple thousand per day to over 500,000.135 The initial response
was mixed. Although most thought that the story itself was good, there were
shortcomings: the evidence provided did not prove some of the claims that Webb was
making, the story relied on unreliable sources, and there didn’t seem to be much of an
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effort to get the CIA’s response to his criticisms.136 Still, he found plenty of supporters,
including Maxine Waters, who was representative for California’s 29th district in the
House of Representatives. Waters called for an investigation into the article’s claims,
asking whether "U.S.-government paid or organized operatives smuggled, transported
and sold it to American citizens."137 Rumors that the US was responsible for the flood of
drugs into inner cities were not new; in 1990, a New York Times phone poll found that a
quarter of the 1,047 African-Americans surveyed thought that the government
''deliberately makes sure that drugs are easily available in poor black neighborhoods in
order to harm black people.''138
Hearings on the matter began in October 1996 in front of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. CIA Inspector-General Frederick Hitz promised a full
internal review of the allegations made in the Dark Alliance series.139 Jack Blum, the
former Kerry committee prosecutor, testified that the answer to the question of whether
the CIA was selling cocaine in Los Angeles to finance the Contras was a “categorical no,”
although he later added that the agency knew about the drug trafficking and turned a
blind eye to the activities.140 Neither of these quelled the rage building in South Central
LA, forcing CIA Director John Deutch to address the community at a town hall event.
Deutch swore that there was “no evidence” that the CIA was involved with, or even
supported, drug traffickers in Nicaragua during the Contra war.141 This was a lie; in fact,
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the CIA had already admitted to dealing with drug traffickers in Central America, Laos,
and Afghanistan, among others.142 One man at the meeting stood up, dismissing
Deutch’s appearance as a PR stunt. “After all of the illegal stuff we know you CIA people
have done around the world, you tell us now that you’re honestly going to investigate
yourselves about drug dealing? You gotta be crazy if you think we’re gonna believe that,”
he said.143
Soon, the CIA’s public relations issue turned into a nightmare. Webb was
appearing on national broadcasts like 60 Minutes to discuss the series’ claims. Waters
had shown up unannounced to the LA County Sheriff’s Department and taken files
related to Blandón’s 1986 investigation, later announcing at an October 7 press
conference that she had found further evidence pointing towards CIA complicity in the
drug trafficking. Two famous African-American civil rights activists, Joe Madison and
Dick Gregory, were arrested for trespassing at CIA headquarters during the course of a
two-man protest in which they demanded to speak with Deutch about the contents of
the series. When Madison was released two days later, he told his story at a meeting of
the Congressional Black Caucus, who were shocked to hear that Gregory was still being
held. “All hell broke loose,” said Madison, who launched a public information campaign
through his radio show, “Black Eagle,” at one point agreeing to a debate with Oliver
North.144 The CIA needed a lifeline, and they got something even better: a complete
deconstruction of the series’ claims, written by major US news sources.
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The first major newspaper to join the fray was the Washington Post. In an article titled,
“The CIA and Crack: Evidence is Lacking of Alleged Plot,” Post writers Roberto Suro and
Walter Pincus claimed that “the available information does not support the conclusion
that the CIA-backed Contras… played a major role in the emergence of crack,” citing
various unnamed law enforcement officials.145 They focused mainly on the
Contradictions in Blandón and Ross’s testimony at the trial; for example, while Webb
highlighted the parts that made it seem like Blandón’s Contra funding had lasted “for
the better part of the decade,” Suro and Pincus wrote about another portion where he
implied that he began keeping his drug profits after Reagan’s election.146 The authors
asserted that, according to their unnamed sources, Blandón only sent between $30,000
and $60,000 back to the Contras and sold five tons of crack during his career as a drug
dealer; Webb claimed that these numbers were in the “hundreds of tons” and “millions
of dollars.”147 Ironically, the Post authors were guilty of the same practices that they
were attacking Webb for: basing their conclusions off of the testimony of drug
traffickers and selectively excluding information that would harm their narrative.
Jerry Ceppos, editor-in-chief of the Mercury News, sent a letter to the editor of
the Post in the days that followed, angrily noting that “[w]hile there is considerable
circumstantial evidence of CIA involvement with the leaders of this drug ring, we never
reached or reported any definitive conclusion on CIA involvement.”148 The Post refused
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to print the letter. Webb discovered after receiving a tip from a reader that Pincus was
recruited by the CIA in the early 1960s to spy on student organizations, bringing into
question the ethical implications of the story.149
While Webb and Ceppos did damage control, more stories were coming out. The
Los Angeles Times published a three-day series of articles that were substantially longer
than Webb’s Dark Alliance, with the first two focusing on Webb’s allegations and the
last questioning whether African-Americans were predisposed to believe in conspiracy
theories more than others. Doyle McManus, the Times’ Washington, D.C. bureau chief,
interviewed multiple high-level sources within the CIA, each of whom unsurprisingly
categorically denied the allegations. Jesse Katz, another reporter who had, in a 1994
article for the paper, described Rick Ross as “a criminal mastermind behind crack’s
decade-long reign,” now said he was merely part of a “cast of interchangeable
characters.”150 Once again, Webb and his editors defended him against the stories,
which seemed to now include personal attacks on Webb himself. One of his editors,
Dawn Garcia, had to call the Times to get a correction on a story they wanted to run that
claimed Webb and Ross had a movie deal; although one was drawn up, Webb refused to
sign it.151 At this point, it seemed that any piece of information that would harm the
credibility of Webb was fair game.
The third paper to get involved was the New York Times. Like the articles before
it, the two that appeared in the Times also relied on statements made by anonymous
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government sources. The author, Tim Golden, had reported on the Contra war from
Honduras and Costa Rica for the Miami Herald, making him uniquely equipped to
respond to the story. He didn’t believe that drug dealing was a major part of the “bad
things” that the Contras were involved in, saying that the premise of the articles – “that
the Contra war and its funding needs fueled the crack epidemic” – was not supported by
the evidence.
Still, Webb found a few defenders, mainly from those not affiliated with the
corporate press. Even if they didn’t necessarily agree with Webb’s conclusions, there
were others that defended him simply because of the amount of resources that these
papers had dedicated to discrediting Webb’s story.152 “What they did… was to jump all
over Dark Alliance without looking at the bigger issue of connections between the CIAbacked Contras and drug dealing,” said David Corn, the Washington editor of Nation
magazine.153 Corn was present at the press conference where the final Senate report on
the Iran Contra affair was announced and remembered an instance where a reporter
asked if allegations of Contra drug-running had been investigated, to which a New York
Times reporter responded, “Come on, let’s talk about something serious.”154 “Those of us
who followed this closely… knew there was a story to which the mainstream press had
never paid serious attention,” he said. When Dark Alliance was published, though, “[the
press] were happy to… shoot it down without examining their own failings on that
front.”155

152

“Editor Shelby Coffee III assigned more than two dozen reporters to the story.” Schou, Kill the Messenger, 134.
Ibid., 145.
154
Ibid.
155
Ibid.
153

Miller 42
The final nail in the coffin for Gary Webb and the Dark Alliance came from Jerry
Ceppos and the San Jose Mercury News. Those at the paper realized that they needed to
publish a follow-up piece responding to the criticism from the mainstream media, and
Ceppos assigned the task to Pete Carey, the Mercury News’ most experienced
investigative reporter.156 Carey ultimately came to a similar conclusion to those papers:
that Blandón, Meneses and Ross could not have been the “first pipeline” of the crack
epidemic. After meeting with Carey, Ceppos, and other editors, Webb tried to
corroborate some of the statements in the articles by going back to Central America and
interviewing more sources, but the drafts he sent back to San Jose had little to do with
the larger issues printed in the original series.157 In lieu of Carey’s article, Ceppos chose
to run a letter from the editor on May 11, 1997, in which he acknowledged that although
there were errors in the reporting and editing of Dark Alliance, specifically concerning
the implications of CIA knowledge of drug dealing by Contra forces, there was still
strong evidence that "a drug ring associated with the Contras sold large quantities of
cocaine. . . . Some of the drug profits from those sales went to the Contras."158
Predictably, the CIA was ecstatic: spokesman Mark Mansfield called the retraction
“gratifying” and thanked the major newspapers for taking “a serious and objective look
at the series.”159 Indeed, the letter was almost universally received as a full retraction,
despite the fact that it was not; headlines on the subject included “CIA Series ‘Fell
Short,’ Editor Says,” and “The Mercury News Comes Clean”. Webb himself was
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subjected to personal attacks, especially in an editorial by Iver Peterson for the New
York Times, which cited some of his earlier libel cases with the Plain Dealer as proof of
his penchant for being a loose cannon.160
After reading Ceppos’ column, Webb was disgusted.161 He thought he was being
censored by the Mercury News, who had not published any of the four follow-up pieces
he had written about some of his less-supported arguments.162 He was also angry that
the article was being used by the “establishment press… to absolve the CIA of any
wrongdoing.”163 “The government side of the story is coming through the Los Angeles
Times, The New York Times, The Washington Post,” he said in an interview in 1998.164
In June, Ceppos asked Webb to agree to a reassignment to Cupertino, where he
covered small stories for a few months before resigning from the paper.165 Over the next
couple years, the CIA and Justice Department published internal reviews of the
allegations; the CIA leaked an executive summary to the Los Angeles Times a week after
Webb’s resignation, which appeared under the headline, “CIA Probe Absolves Agency on
L.A. Crack.”166 The full report, released several months later, admitted that the CIA had
advance knowledge of Contra drug running, including in the activities of Enrique
Bermudez, the CIA asset handpicked to lead the FDN.167 The L.A. Times did not
acknowledge this report, while the New York Times wrote off the admissions, arguing
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that they “did not lend any new support” to the claims in the Dark Alliance.168 Webb
attempted to vindicate his reporting, writing a book in 1998 with an independent
publisher, but all the while was falling deeper and deeper into depression. Six years
later, Webb would be found dead from two gunshot wounds to the head in an apparent
suicide.
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Conspiratorial beliefs and conclusions
The tragedy of Gary Webb played out on the world stage. He was hailed by some as a
courageous whistleblower, brave enough to take on the CIA and its infinite resources for
the greater good, while others dismissed him as a conspiracy theorist looking for
connections that just weren’t there. Whether you believed him or not, it was not hard to
see that Webb’s series had divided Americans, largely on racial divides. “By its disparate
impact, the story has also underscored both the profound mistrust of government that
history has engendered among many blacks and the difficulty that many whites have in
understanding their views,” read a portion of a New York Times article on the subject in
1996.169 Subject matter like this was not uncommon in the press coverage of the Dark
Alliance, as reporters attempted to discern the reason why the African-American
community seemed to care so much about a story that the mainstream press deemed
flawed and inaccurate. Don Middleton, who was interviewed for the Times story,
summed it up: ''The white press is pointing fingers at the black community, saying we're
paranoid and quick to see conspiracy at every turn of the corner. Where have they been
for the last 30 years? Can I just mention the Tuskegee syphilis study, Cointelpro,
Watergate, Iran-Contra. Hello, America?''170
The question of what drives conspiratorial beliefs has been asked multiple times
by academics throughout the years. Conspiratorial beliefs seem to appear in the greatest
number during times of sociopolitical turmoil, or when there is “significant uncertainty
in the world,” said Sander van der Linden, a social psychologist at Cambridge. 171 This
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can be seen in cases from the Salem Witch Trials, which saw entire towns swept with a
fear of a coven of witches meeting in secret and planning misdeeds, to more modern
examples like McCarthyism and QAnon. Those who are more prone to believe in
conspiracies may do so to preserve a sense of order about the world, said Ben Radford, a
research fellow at the Center for Skeptical Inquiry. This epistemic benefit is just one of
many that may cause someone to form conspiratorial beliefs; others include the
existential benefit of distracting them from their fears, and the social benefit of joining a
conspiracy-oriented community and finding like-minded individuals. Susceptibility to
believing in conspiracies may also be driven by political cues. Data shows that
partisanship may drive the ‘direction’ of conspiratorial beliefs, such that Democrats may
believe that Republicans are working against them, but not the level of belief.172
Dark Alliance reaffirmed many of the beliefs and experiences that AfricanAmericans in South Central LA had during the crack cocaine epidemic that was ripping
through their community. The low level of skill needed to launch a successful career
selling the drug, combined with the relative ease of finding enough to sell, contributed to
the rapid rise of drug-related violence in these communities as dealers sought to defend
their turf.173 In an attempt to curb the sale of crack, the US government created a 100:1
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, which ultimately
disproportionately affected African-Americans, who were more likely to use crack than
their white counterparts.174 When you combine this fact with the implications of CIA
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involvement in the crack epidemic, it is easier to see why this particular story led to the
formation of conspiratorial beliefs. “Everybody my age or older has always known that
something like this was going on,'' said Beverly Carr, a Compton resident during the
1990s. ''Who down here in Watts or Compton has planes or boats to get these drugs up
here? They're targeting the young black men. It's just ruining a whole generation.''175
Some anthropologists view these conspiratorial beliefs as a way of contesting
power.176 The communities most affected by the allegations of CIA drug trafficking were
those that the state and its institutions and policies had already failed, so conspiracism
became a form of resistance against those in power.177 In general, research shows that
those beliefs were likely shaped by two factors: the social infrastructure of bureaucracy,
which influenced the content of the belief; and the architecture of the information that
each person received, which structured the beliefs.178 The specific architecture of the
Dark Alliance, or way that the information was presented, is interesting because the
Mercury News released print and online versions of the articles. The Internet was still a
new invention in the late 1990s, so it was a new experience for many to get information
from hyperlinks within the story. The digital culture was also overwhelmingly white, so
an online story of this magnitude would have raised the consciousness of AfricanAmericans of the Internet while allowing readers to conduct their own research and
alter the structure of their beliefs based on research they conducted on their own.
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Another factor contributing to the skepticism on both sides was the
trustworthiness of the CIA itself. The agency had gone through a reckoning of sorts both
during and after Watergate, which saw the release of many classified documents
admitting to, among other things, attempting to manipulate domestic media for its own
propaganda during the Cold War. Although DCI George H. W. Bush swore in 1976 that
the CIA would not enter into “any paid or Contractual relationship with any full-time or
part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper,
periodical, radio or television network or station,” there was no reason to trust them,
especially now.179 The CIA is, by nature, a secretive organization, but it is difficult to
trust what you cannot see. Because of the agency’s valuable intelligence-gathering
activities, secrecy is understood to be a “legitimate dimension of government,” especially
when it concerns the security and defense of the state.180 However, the general
assumption that “whatever is not public is a priori suspicious” is a common one among
the public.181 Secrets of the state are difficult to legislate, and the CIA’s history of
deception and misdeeds fed into the belief among African-American communities in LA
that the agency was using secrecy as a method of covering up abuses of power.182
On the flip side, there was little reason to trust Webb’s sources, either. He himself
was initially unwilling to pursue the Dark Alliance, unsure of whether Rafael Cornejo
was another drug dealer attempting to skirt the law or actually expose a wrong. 183 Once
he decided to pursue the story, he was met with more drug dealers as his only source on
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many crucial facts of the case. “I used to say to people… ‘Bring me a Lutheran pastor
who was there when the drugs were unloaded in Miami and I’ll bring him in as a
witness,’” said Jack Blum, chief prosecutor for the Kerry Committee hearings. 184 “[News
coverage of the hearings] focused on how the witnesses weren’t credible because they
were drug dealers. These were the only witnesses we had.”185
“Every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition: information to
form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some
conclusion about it,” writes John Zaller in his book The Nature and Origins of Mass
Opinion.186 This definition encapsulates why the Dark Alliance was so controversial: a
person’s predisposition on the issue strongly influenced the conclusions they got from
reading the articles. Although Webb did not definitively state that the CIA was
transporting drugs to Los Angeles and selling them in African-American communities,
that was certainly in the realm of possibility for those who knew of past CIA
transgressions in which they were complicit in equally sinister plots. For those who had
not been personally impacted, it was easy to spot holes in the reporting and decry the
whole connection between the CIA and drug trafficking as circumstantial. The side that
received the louder mouthpiece, in this case the support of the press, would have an
upper hand when attempting to shift the consensus to their belief system, and the
winner of that battle in this case is clear. The consequence of this relationship between
the press and government is that accountability for both groups was diminished, and
this is the true value of the Dark Alliance saga: it called attention to the many ways in
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which the media can be manipulated to serve the interests of the government. Webb
never explicitly said that the CIA was trafficking crack cocaine and selling it in Los
Angeles, but the articles attacking his reporting insinuated as much, while minimizing
or otherwise ignoring the rest of his research that still characterized the CIA as
indifferent to the fact that crack cocaine sold in the US was supporting its war in
Nicaragua. This allowed the government to begin sweeping a damning story under the
rug without fear of the mainstream media acting as a watchdog, and that is how a lack of
accountability in both the media and government can lead to misdeeds that go
unpunished.
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